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Louisiana law to an English court.20 Thus, on the basis of Hess v.
Pawloski and the more general considerations involved in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, the court's conclusion that serv-
ice of process on the Secretary of State in cases like this one does
not offend due process of law seems reasonable.
21
While there may be some disagreement as to whether or not
Pennoyer v. Neff has been abandoned, 22 it is certain that service
of process on the defendant within the state as a requirement of
due process no longer carries the same meaning that it did when
first announced. An expansion of state jurisdiction has been
recognized in the decisions, especially where the defendant has
been a foreign corporation. The International Shoe case in-
creased this tendency.23 The instant case sanctions the statutory
agent device of the Hess decision in an application of the Inter-
national Shoe doctrine.
John S. White, Jr.
FRENCH CIVIL LAW-SALES-EARNEST MONEY
Plaintiff deposited 200,000 francs with defendant during the
course of their negotiations for the sale of defendant's immovable
property. Upon failure to agree on the terms of the contract,
although a price of 1,000,000 francs had been agreed upon, defen-
dant retained the deposit on the grounds that it constituted
earnest money within the meaning of Code Civil article 1590.1
Plaintiff instituted suit to recover the deposit. He contended that
article 1590 was inapplicable, because the payment had been
made to secure preference over another prospective buyer and
20. The burden of proving a difference between the law of England and
any foreign law is upon the party who asserts its existence. 13 HALSBURY,
LAWS OF ENGLAND 614, § 685 (2d ed. 1934); see, e.g., Smith v. Gould, The
Prince George, [1842] 4 Moo. P.C.C. 21.
21. The defenses based on the interstate and foreign commerce clause,
and the admiralty clause of the Federal Constitution were rejected sum-
marily on authority of Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Sher-
lock v. Ailing, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); Pueblo v. H. E. Moss & Co., 159 F.2d 842
(2d Cir. 1947).
22. 23 U.S.L. WEEK 1101 (Jan. 11, 1955), announced the case with the fol-
lowing headline, "Pennoyer v. Neff Overruled, Federal District Court Holds."
23. See Note, The Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. OF
CHI. L. REV. 523 (1949).
1. Art. 2463, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870 is identical. It states: "But if the prom-
ise to sell has been made with the giving of earnest, each of the contracting
parties is at liberty to recede from the promise; to wit: he who has given
the earnest, by forfeiting it; and he who has received it, by returning the
double."
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hence should be treated as a payment on the price, to be returned
in the event the sale was not perfected. From an adverse judg-
ment, defendant appealed. Held, affirmed. Although article 1590
is applicable to preliminary negotiations, the payment was not
earnest money because the parties did not intend to treat the
payment as a forfeit. Dumont v. Artztein, Cour d'appel de
Nancy, March 17, 1954 (Gazette du Palais 1954.1.311).
Although Louisiana and France have identical code articles
dealing with earnest money, the application of these articles
under both systems is quite different. Article 2463 of the Louisi-
ana Civil Code provides that "if the promise to sell has been made
with the giving of earnest, each of the contracting parties is at
liberty to recede from his promise." (Emphasis added.) Although
until 1910 article 2462 stated simply that "a promise to sell . . .
amounts to a sale,"'2 the courts consistently held that a contract
to sell did not transfer title and that the assimilation of a promise
to sell to a sale meant only that the parties to a contract to sell
are entitled to specific performance.3 Therefore, the statement is
found in cases involving immovable property that article 2463,
dealing with earnest money, is applicable only to contracts to
sell.4 This is probably due to the fact that a sale of an immovable
is not perfected in Louisiana until execution of an act translative
of title.5 Thus, when an act translative of title is executed the
executory contract to sell becomes a perfected sale and forfeiture
of a deposit in the event of non-execution of the'contract is no
longer possible. However, in transactions involving movables,
the sale is perfect as soon as there exists an agreement on the
object and the price, although the price has not been paid, nor
delivery made." Thus, if the rule found in cases involving immov-
ables, that earnest money is applicable only to contracts to sell,
is applied to agreements concerning movables, a deposit accom-
panying an agreement for the sale of a particular movable at an
agreed price could not constitute earnest rrioney, because the
2. In 1910, article 2462 was amended to read as follows: "A promise to
sell . . . so far amounts to a sale, as to give either party the right to enforce
specific performance of same." La. Acts 1910, No. 249, p. 417.
3. Capo v. Bugdahl, 117 La. 992, 42 So. 478 (1906); Girault v. Feucht, 117
La. 276, 41 So. 572 (1906); Peck v. Bemiss, 10 La. Ann. 160 (1855); McDonald
v. Aubert, 17 La. 448 (1841).
4. McCain v. Hicks, 150 La. 43, 90 So. 506 (1921); Smith v. Hussey, 119
La. 32, 43 So. 902 (1907); Capo v. Bugdahl, 117 La. 992, 42 So. 478 (1906).
. 5. Art. 2275, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. See also Hebert, The Function of
Earnest Money in the Civil Law of Sales, 11 LOYOLA L.J. 121, 137 (1930) and
cases cited therein.
6. Art. 2456, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870.
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agreement was a perfected sale. This would tend toward restrict-
ing the application of earnest money to transactions involving
immovable property. However, there are no decisions adopting
the view that, with respect to movables, earnest money is appli-
cable only to contracts to sell. Even after it is found that the
nature of the contract permits the application of article 2463,
there is the additional problem of determining whether a deposit
accompanying that contract constitutes earnest money. Louisiana
courts presume that all such deposits are intended as forfeits,7
except where there is positive proof to the contrary.8 For in-
stance, deposits have been held to be earnest money, even though
the agreement stated that the payment had been made "on ac-
count of the purchase"9 or "to bind my purchase." 10 Similarly, a
payment of "10 per cent. of the purchase price" included in an
offer to purchase immovable property was held to be earnest
money.1
In France, the well-settled view is that article 1590, dealing
with earnest money, is applicable to unexecuted sales as well as
promises to sell.12 This is a consequence of the provision in arti-
7. Livingston v. Southport Mill, 173 La. 120, 136 So. 289 (1931); Buckman
v. Stafford, Derbes & Roy, 167 La. 540, 119 So. 701 (1929); Capo v. Bugdahl,
117 La. 992, 42 So. 478 (1906); Yates v. Batteford, 19 La. App. 374, 139 So. 37
(1932). For a short time, the court departed from this position in the cases
of Nosacka v. McKenzie, 127 La. 1063, 54 So. 351 (1911) and Provenzano v.
Glaesser, 122 La. 378, 385, 47 So. 688, 690 (1908), in which the court held that
the words "ten per cent . . . on account of the purchase price" indicated that
the parties did not intend that the deposit be considered as earnest money.
But this view was expressly overruled in the case of Maloney v. Aschaffen-
burg, 143 La. 509, 78 So. 761 (1918). See also Hebert, The Function of Earnest
Money in the Civil Law of Sales, 11 LOYOLA L.J. 121, 138-141 (1930).
8. If the agreement contains language clearly indicating that forfeit was
not intended, the deposit is treated as a payment on the price, entitling the
parties to specific performance. Moresi v. Burleigh, 170 La. 270, 273, 127 So.
624, 625 (1930) (agreement stated: "it is agreed that the amount given . . . is
not earnest money, but shall form part of the price. ... ); Wright v. Derbes,
168 La. 335, 122 So. 57 (1929) (promissory note given in lieu of second mort-
gage with understanding that as soon as mortgage was executed, notes would
be returned); Jacobs v. Freyhan, 156 La. 585, 587, 100 So. 726, 727 (1924)
(agreement stated that the deposit "is not to be considered as earnest money,
the parties hereto reserving the right to demand specific performance.").
9. Legier v. Braughn, 123 La. 463, 465, 49 So. 22 (1909).
10. Smith v. Hussey, 119 La. 32, 33, 43 So. 902, 903 (1907).
11. Maloney v. Aschaffenburg, 143 La. 509, 511, 78 So. 761 (1918).
12. Although CODE CIVIL art. 1590 speaks only of promises to sell, its rule
concerning arrhes, or earnest money, is equally applicable to unexecuted
sales, because of the assimilation made in article 1589 of a promise to sell to
a sale. 5 AuBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 349, n. 36 (5th ed. 1907); 2
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, PR]tCIS DE DROIT CIVIL no 744 (13th ed. 1925); 2 COLIN ET
CAPITANT, COURS 9LMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS nos 831, 834 (10th ed. 1953);
2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT2 ftL]MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no 2434, n. 2 (3d ed. 1949).
Contra, 6 MARCAD, EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL 172, 173 (1875); 1 POTHIER, TREAT-
ISE ON CONTRACTS 479 (Cushing's transl. 1839).
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cle 1589 that la promesse de vente vaut vente,"'13 which is con-
sidered by the modern commentators as a complete assimilation
of a promise to sell to a sale.14 The instant case states that, in
France, earnest money is also applicable to preliminary negotia-
tions. The difference between Louisiana and French law on the
subject of earnest money extends even further. In France, de-
spite the presumption that a deposit is intended as a forfeit, 5 the
question of whether the deposit constitutes earnest money es-
sentially depends upon the intentions of the parties as evidenced
by the surrounding circumstances.16 Thus, depending upon the
intentions of the parties, a deposit accompanying negotiations, a
promise to sell, or a contract of sale may constitute (1) a forfeit
under article 1590 in which case the parties will have the privi-
lege of withdrawal or (2) proof of the contract, or (3) a partial
payment on the price." In finding the intentions of the parties,
the French courts rely on the circumstances surrounding the
transaction. Thus, in the instant case, although there was no
written evidence of the parties' intentions, the court found that
the substantial amount of the deposit"8 and the previous offer by
the other prospective buyer indicated that the parties did not
consider the payment as a forfeit, but as a payment on the price.
The more flexible French system does not impart the degree of
certainty in the law of immovable property which the Louisiana
jurisprudence has produced. On the other hand, the Louisiana
approach of viewing all deposits accompanying contracts to sell
13. CODE CIVIL art. 1589,
14. See note 12 supra.
15. 10 PLANIOL ET RiPERT, TRAIT9 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 209, n. 3
(1932).
16. 2 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, PRCTS DE DROIT CIVIL no 745 (13th ed. 1925); 6
MARCADO, EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL 181 (1875); 2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT9
tL9MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no 2434 (3d ed. 1949). In discussing whether article
1590 was a rigid rule to be applied in all cases, Marcad6 stated: "[Ilt is a
question of intention of the parties ... a question of fact that the judge
ought to decide in each case, by the custom of the locality, by the importance
of the earnest money compared to the price of the thing, by the habits of the
parties . . . .It is by this means and as a question of fact, that he will
determine whether the sum remitted has been intended as forfeit, or by in-
dication to the contrary, as proof of the contract, or as a payment on the
price .... ." (Author's translation.)
17. 10 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT]t PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS nO 209
(1932).
18. Although the distinction between earnest money and a payment on
the price depends upon the intentions of the parties, a substantial deposit is
a factor which is generally considered when determining whether the pay-
ment was on the price or earnest'money. 17 BAUDRY-LANCANTINERIE ET SAIGNET,
TRAITt TH9IORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL no 85 (2d ed. 1900); 6 MARCADIk, Ex-
PLICATION DU CODE CIVIL 181 (1875); 2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITI ILI MENTAIRS DI
DROIT CIVIL no 2434 (3d ed. 1949).
NOTES
as forfeits may lead to results not envisaged by the parties. Al-
though French courts apply earnest money to unexecuted sales
and Louisiana has restricted its application to contracts to sell,
the results reached under both systems are for all practical pur-
poses identical. Under neither system would a deposit constitute
earnest money after the sale has been executed by delivery. In
France, earnest money is applicable to perfected sales of both
movables and immovables, although a sale may be perfected
before delivery has been made or the price paid.19 In Louisiana,
however, a sale of an immovable is not perfected until an act
translative of title is executed,20 at which time delivery takes
place.2 1 In France, delivery of an immovable is accomplished by
delivery of the title papers. 22 Therefore, earnest money applies
in France until delivery, although the sale may have been per-
fected before, and it applies in Louisiana until delivery although
the sale will not be perfected before. The question of the applica-
tion of earnest money to contracts involving movable property
should not depend on whether the transaction constitutes a sale
or a contract to sell, but on whether the contract has been exe-
cuted by delivery. A forfeit is given as an alternative to perform-
ance, and when performance is rendered, the election is made.
Therefore, when the transaction has been completed by delivery,
there is no basis for the court to conclude that a payment was
intended as a forfeit.
William C. Hollier
INSURANcE-AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY-INTERPRETATION
OF TERM "EACH ACCIDENT"
Defendant's negligently driven truck collided with a freight
train and damaged sixteen boxcars belonging to fourteen sep-
arate owners. The railroad company, on its own behalf and
presumably acting under assignments in its favor, brought suit
against the defendant. Defendant's automobile liability insurance
policy limited the insurer's liability for bodily injury to each
person to $100,000, to $300,000 for each occurrence, and for prop-
19. See note 12 supra.
20. See note 5 supra.
21. Art. 2479, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; Succession of Curtis, 156 La. 243, 100
So. 412 (1924); Brown v. Brown, 30 La. Ann. 966 (1878); Laurans v. Garnier,
10 Rob. 425 (La. 1845); Lallande v. Lee, 9 Rob. 514 (La. 1845); Greco v. Mil-
lano, 13 Orl. App. 134 (La. App. 1916).
22. CODE CIVIL art. 1605.
1955]
